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U.S. Antitrust Aspects of Competing in Foreign Markets and
the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement
Joseph P. Griffin *
Michael R. Calabrese**
I. INTRODUCTION
I n this Article we will examine the recent evolution of U.S. antitrust
policy. This subject has been commented on frequently,1 though much
of what has been written has been, in our view, misleading or wrong.
After reviewing these changes, we will discuss the recently concluded
Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement2 ("ITA") and what impact it may have
on competition policy issues between Canada and the United States.
One of the historical ironies of U.S. antitrust policy is that, in hind-
sight, the 1950s were the high water mark of U.S. antitrust extraterritori-
ality, or what might be called the evangelical period of the antitrust
religion. The United States imposed its antitrust policies on Germany
and Japan while acting as the occupying power after World War II.
Those policies subsequently were adopted by the European Community
in the late 1950s. Yet, just as the United States was attracting converts
to our antitrust beliefs, we began to have substantial doubts ourselves,
first for economic reasons and later for political and finally, foreign pol-
icy reasons.
II. ANTITRUST UNDER ATTACK
In the 1950s, the U.S. antitrust laws began to be subjected to in-
creasing criticism by various commentators for a number of different rea-
sons. The first of these objections is the frequent complaint of
businesspersons that the antitrust laws are impossible to comply with due
to their ambiguity and complexity.
This sentiment is reinforced by a number of peculiarities of the U.S.
legal system which create incentives to litigate business disputes. Trebled
antitrust damages is a major incentive. A successful antitrust plaintiff is
* Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C., Chairman, ABA Section of Interna-
tional Law and Practice, 1987-88.
** Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C.
I See, eg., Donlan, When Justice is Done, BARRONS 15 (Dec. 15, 1983); Meadows, Bold Depar-
tures in Antitrust, FORTUNE 180 (Oct. 5, 1981).
2 Can.-U.S. Trade Agreement, Dec. 10, 1987, reprinted in DEP'T OF EXTERNAL AFF. (1987)
[hereinafter FTA].
1
Griffin and Calabrese: U.S. Antitrust Aspects of Competing in Foreign Markets and the Ca
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1988
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
entitled to three times alleged damages3 and, pointedly, attorney fees,
which can be larger than the damages. However, the United States does
not follow the English practice whereby successful defendants are able to
recover their costs.
In addition to trebled damages, the U.S. legal system allows contin-
gent fees, class actions, "fishing expedition" type discovery, and notice
pleading, all of which are incentives to bring a lawsuit. Thus, the combi-
nation of the ambiguity of the law itself, the very substantial penalties for
its violation, and the incentives to litigate in the U.S. system all lead to
considerable fear of violating the antitrust laws on the part of
businesspersons.
As businesspersons began to point out some of the negative com-
mercial consequences of the U.S. antitrust laws, economists began to ar-
gue that the antitrust laws do not always make economic sense. This
thesis was developed mainly by economists from the University of Chi-
cago and has been characterized by its proponents as a theory of "eco-
nomic rationality." The thesis has several subparts but, simply put, the
idea is that many aspects of the antitrust laws are premised on either
incorrect or outdated economic assumptions. These commentators point
out that the antitrust laws were enacted at a time when international
competition was practically nonexistent.
These theorists argued that in today's highly competitive global
environment the U.S. antitrust laws must be adjusted to relate to the
phenomenon of global competition. Trade policy concepts such as "reci-
procity," "level playing fields," and "targeting" of U.S. companies were
developed as antitrust law began to be seen as a deterrent both to U.S.
penetration of foreign markets and the preservation of domestic U.S.
markets from foreign competition. Other antitrust scholars argued that
antitrust laws were simply never meant to deal with international trade;
they are entirely domestic in their focus and, for that reason also, are
outdated in the modern world.4
A third strain of criticism came mainly from abroad, as foreign
companies and governments maintained that U.S. antitrust policies were
insensitive to foreign interests. So-called "blocking" statutes were en-
acted, and there arose substantial foreign resistance to U.S. discovery
procedures, to U.S. notions of the way to run a business, and the way to
organize an economy.5 As these foreign voices grew in economic power
3 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
4 See, eg., D. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986); R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV.
1 (1984); Smith, Why Not Abolish Antitrust, 7 REG. 23 (Jan./Feb. 1983).
5 J. GRIFFIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST
AND OTHER LAWS (1979); April & Fried, Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational
Litigation: A Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 961 (1984); Note, Foreign Nondisclo-
sure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
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they became more and more strident in their criticism of U.S. extraterri-
toriality. Indeed, the decline of U.S. economic power abroad has been
simultaneous with the decline of the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust.
III. "CORRECTIVE" MEASURES
In 1977 the U.S. Justice Department tried to lessen the criticism by
attempting to clarify how the U.S. antitrust laws applied to international
business. The Division published a set of guidelines called the Antitrust
Guide for International Operations,6 which was meant to be a statement
of the Antitrust Division's enforcement policy. The changes in law and
policy that were occurring during this period soon put the 1977 Guide
out of date. After three years of dedicated work, the Justice Department
has recently released a Draft Antitrust Guidelines for International Oper-
ations that reflects a number of the changes in antitrust law and policy
that occurred during the past eleven years.
The U.S. Congress also attempted to clarify the international aspects
of U.S. antitrust policy. In 1982, Congress amended parts of the anti-
trust laws to limit the effect of the 1978 Pfizer8 decision. In Pfizer the
Government of India sued a U.S. drug company asserting that the Gov-
ernment had standing to litigate price fixing of drugs that it purchased.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the "persons" entitled to sue for treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act include foreign govern-
ments. Congress limited the Pfizer decision by amending the Clayton
Act to provide that in situations where the government plaintiff acts in a
sovereign rather than a commercial capacity, that government may only
recover actual damages, plus costs. 9
Also in 1982 Congress enacted the Export Trading Company Act, 10
another attempt to clarify how the antitrust laws apply in the interna-
tional marketplace. Pursuant to this statute, any U.S. person engaged in
the export trade may request a certificate of review from the U.S. Secre-
tary of Commerce covering certain conduct specified in an application.
If (after consultation with the U.S. Attorney General) the certificate is
granted, the holder is protected against criminal and treble damage liabil-
ity for the conduct specified in the certificate that occurred while the
certificate was in effect.
The problem with the Export Trading Company Act was that it was
premised on the notion of developing a Japanese-style trading company
system. But instead of promoting the creation of Japanese-style trading
companies, the program has promoted the establishment of small groups
6 U.S. DEP'T. JUST., Antitrust Guide for International Operations (1977).
7 See Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21, 584 (1988).
8 Pfizer v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
9 15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(1982).
10 Id. §§ 4011-21.
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of small- to mid-size exporters of primarily agricultural products. In the
6 years of the program, more than 80 certificates have been issued cover-
ing over 700 different U.S. companies. However, principally because the
export trading companies have been small- to medium-size firms, the
U.S. exports facilitated through export trading companies have not been
significant. 1
Also in 1982 Congress passed amendments to the Sherman and Fed-
eral Trade Commission ("FTC") Acts. These amendments provided
that the Sherman and FTC Acts would apply when there is a "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. domestic or import
commerce." 12 This also marks the first time in U.S. history that the anti-
trust laws made a clear legal distinction between export-related conduct
and import-related conduct, permitting conduct related to the export
trade that would be prohibited in import trade or domestic commerce.
IV. CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY AND JUDICIAL ATTITUDES
In the meantime, the Reagan administration was adopting as public
policy the theories of the Chicago school antitrust critics. One of the
great apostles of the economic rationality movement, Professor Baxter
from Stanford University, was put in charge of the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department. He promptly reduced the Division staff and
budget, and reoriented the Division to focusing on why they should not
sue people rather than why they should. It was Professor Baxter who
in 1982 terminated the IBM case after thirteen years of inconclusive
litigation. 13
The Reagan administration also appointed as judges numerous pro-
ponents of the Chicago school approach to antitrust, such as Judges Pos-
ner, Easterbrook and Bork, and the courts began to render Chicago
school type antitrust decisions. One of the most well known of these is
the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 decision in the Zenith 14 case, which sub-
stantially revised the definition of predatory pricing.
Just a year earlier in the Mitsubishi case, the Supreme Court re-
versed a long-standing policy by holding that parties could arbitrate anti-
trust disputes arising in international contexts.1 " The U.S. policy always
had been that antitrust enforcement was so sacred and so important, that
one could not possibly rely on the decisions of arbitrators. Although the
Court's decision in Mitsubishi is limited to international situations, there
are now a number of lower court cases applying the Mitsubishi rationale
11 See CORP. COUNS. INT'L ADVISOR, UPDATE: ANTITRUST 34-39 (Mar. 1988); U.S. GEN.
AccT. OFF., EXPORT PROMOTION: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT
OF 1982 at 1 (Feb. 1986).
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3); see H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
13 See Wall Street J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 3.
14 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
15 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 615 (1985).
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domestically and enforcing agreements to arbitrate domestic antitrust
disputes. 16
Even before the Reagan appointees' influence was felt, another ap-
proach to limiting the international applicability of U.S. antitrust law
was developed by the courts. Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number of
U.S. courts began to agree with the assertion that the United States
should be sensitive to foreign interests in the international application of
its laws. In determining whether U.S. antitrust jurisdiction should reach
international conduct, these courts developed an approach based on con-
flicts-of-law principles pursuant to which foreign interests were balanced
against U.S. interests. Under this "jurisdictional rule-of-reason" ap-
proach, rather than simply asserting that an act that affects U.S. com-
merce provides antitrust jurisdiction, judges began to consider facts such
as the nationality of the parties, the location of the conduct, the ex-
pressed policy interests of foreign governments, and the identity of the
foreign governments. But, to one's great surprise, the courts that used
this approach almost universally concluded that, even after the balanc-
ing, there was jurisdiction.17
The Reagan administration has recently introduced legislation codi-
fying this jurisdictional rule of reason.18 In addition, a jurisdictional
"rule-of-reason" analysis has been adopted by the most recent Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law published by the American Law
Institute. 19
In response to the balancing of interests approach a number of for-
eign governments became more assertive in enacting blocking statutes to
firmly declare their opposition to extraterritorial jurisdiction. An exam-
ple is Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act.2" There is also an
antitrust cooperation agreement between the Canadian and U.S. Govern-
ments.2 1 It provides for cooperation, consultation, and prior notification.
It does not resolve the extraterritorial issue, but tries to manage it by
interposing an obligation of advance notification.
16 See, eg., Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
17 See, eg., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 631 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd after remand, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 473 U.S.
1032 (1985).
18 See H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 403, 415 (1987).
20 See 24 I.L.M. 794 (1985). For similar developments in other countries, see, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 473 n. 1, 4; Griffin, United States Antitrust
Laws and Transnational Business Transactions: An Introduction, 21 IN'L LAW. 307, 309 n. 3
(1987) (collecting authorities).
21 See 23 I.L.M. 794 (1984).
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V. THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF ANTITRUST
Other issues such as U.S. trade policy have overtaken antitrust pol-
icy in national importance. For example, in 1987, in announcements
concerning U.S. Government intervention in the superconductor area,
President Reagan said that "the antitrust laws must be brought up to
speed. Let's stop penalizing American business and treating it like an
enemy. Let's give ourselves a fair shake in the world marketplace."22
His remarks were in the context of promoting what otherwise might be
deemed to be an anticompetitive agreement to promote the joint develop-
ment of superconductors.
To summarize this recent history, a number of propositions seem
evident.
First, there is a very clear distinction between export-related conduct
and import-related conduct. U.S. laws either by their terms do not apply,
or simply will not be enforced against conduct that promotes U.S. ex-
ports or injures only foreigners outside the United States. That is, if
Americans can increase their market share in Canada by engaging in
anticompetitive activity in Canada, the U.S. antitrust laws will not apply
to that activity. On the other hand, if Canadians take actions in Canada
that have an anticompetitive effect in the U.S. market, either directly or
on U.S. exports, U.S. courts certainly will exercise jurisdiction, and there
will be U.S. Government enforcement. Thus, the United States is much
more interested in enforcing and protecting competition inside its own
market than outside of its market, even if that conduct is engaged in by
Americans. The most dramatic example is that of the export trading
company that is granted an antitrust certificate of immunity for conduct
in Canada that would be illegal if done within the United States. As long
as the conduct relates only to U.S. export trade, it will be immunized.
Second, the "management of international trade" has been adopted
as a U.S. public policy. There has always been at least a potential conflict
in the United States between antitrust policy and international trade pol-
icy for very fundamental reasons.23 Antitrust law is meant to preserve
competition, and where there is competition, there are winners and
losers. In many international trade situations, particularly those cases in
which the firm employs many voters, the objective of the case is to pro-
tect the losers, to prevent them from losing and to have their market
share and their industry preserved. Recent developments show a U.S.
preference for managed, protectionist trade policies over policies aimed
at enhancing competition.
Third, as the United States has become more sensitive and susceptible
to foreign challenges, it has taken an increasingly schizophrenic approach
to international trade management. With respect to large, important in-
22 See INT'L TRADE REP. 993 (Aug. 5, 1987).
23 See, e.g., Symposium, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law & Policy, 56 ANTITRUsT L.J.
397 (1987).
Vol. 14:85 1988
6
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 14 [1988], Iss. , Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol14/iss/15
Griffln-U.S. ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF COMPETITION
dustries and issues such as automobiles, steel, semiconductors and super-
conductors, the United States does not pretend to take a competitive
approach. In some ways the U.S. Government tries to conceal its man-
agement of trade by using terms such as "voluntary restraints" or "uni-
lateral conduct," but such references are not seriously to be believed.
The most egregious example of this trend is the semiconductor
agreement with Japan24 which resembles a price fixing cartel organized
by the U.S. and Japanese Governments, applying not only to Japanese-
American trade, but in third countries as well. How could such an
agreement survive the U.S. Government's antitrust scrutiny? The an-
swer is that trade politics makes strange bedfellows. On the other hand,
U.S. politicians are perfectly happy to let the competitive process work in
other cases, where there is no significant political interest, voting block or
political action committee.
VI. COMPETITION POLICY AND THE FTA
Against this background stands the FrA. The FTA is justly praised
as a significant bilateral achievement. It is ambitiously broad in scope,
providing for trade liberalization in nearly all economic sectors of both
countries. It is ambitious in that it provides for binding commitments in
the areas of trade in services, business travel and investments. But it
works no revolution with respect to bilateral competition policy issues.
The FTA is unlikely to have a major impact on US. competition pol-
icy. The FTA is silent with respect to international antitrust and extra-
territorial discovery issues. The FTA does promise less Canadian
Government control of acquisitions by U.S. companies.25 There will be
intergovernmental consultations about designating monopolies26 and
about restrictions on government-created monopolies.2 7 That is all the
FTA has to say about competition policy.
The FTA will not create a unified North American market. Unlike
the European Community model, Canada and the United States are not
creating a single market or a supranational enforcement mechanism, like
the European Court of Justice, to maintain a system of both law and
enforcement. There has, in fact, been no real attempt to harmonize the
competition laws of Canada and the United States. The dispute resolu-
tion mechanism of the FTA does not apply to competition issues. Thus,
disputes over extraterritoriality, discovery procedure, and the U.S. incen-
tives to litigation will remain.
The FTA offers significant opportunities for bilateral consultation, but
leaves a number of significant competition policy issues unanswered. The
FTA continues the trend, begun with the 1984 antitrust cooperation
24 See 25 I.L.M. 1048 (1986).
25 FTA, supra note 2, arts. 1601-11.
26 Id. arts. 2010(1), (2).
27 Id. arts. 2010(3).
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agreement, toward consultation and away from confrontation. The big-
gest remaining problem is what the British call the "rogue elephant of
U.S. antitrust," which is the private treble damage action. What about
other "rogue elephants" of U.S. antitrust - the contingency fee class
action and "fishing expedition" type discovery? These, too, are left unaf-
fected by the PTA.
As more Canadian firms export to the United States and the market
opens up, the firms are going to be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts. As they begin to compete with and to surpass the U.S. firms,
what response will the Americans make? It is not an unknown tactic to
bring massive antitrust litigation, designed not so much to win, but to
slow down your opponent's market penetration.
What about using the import relief statutes against market penetra-
tion practices? These actions are very expensive to defend and it is diffi-
cult to prove whether or not they are being brought in good faith. Does
the FTA imply that potash quotas and uranium quotas can now be chal-
lenged more easily by U.S. antitrust plaintiffs?
How are Canadian officials going to react to the increasing use of
U.S. export trading companies in Canada? What will be the reaction of
the Canadian antitrust authorities in dealing with the anticompetitive ac-
tivities that have been certified by the U.S. Government?
In conclusion, we believe that the FTA has little to offer with re-
spect to a harmonized competition policy for North America. Conflicts
in competition policy are, therefore, likely to continue.
It also seems that the U.S. antitrust "religion" is coming back to
haunt its first proponents. In its 1984 Wood Pulp decision, 8 the Euro-
pean Commission found a violation of the European Community anti-
trust laws for price fixing in the European wood pulp market by an
export trading association formed under the Webb-Pomerene Act - an
earlier version of the Export Trading Company Act - and imposed a
very substantial fine. Just for good measure the Commission based its
decision on the "effects" doctrine of jurisdiction, which is the jurisdic-
tional premise for U.S. antitrust extraterritoriality at its most extreme.
The Wood Pulp case is now pending before the European Court of
Justice, and should be decided very shortly. It will be fascinating to see
how the United States reacts to that decision, and if U.S. policy makers
admit that, while they believed in antitrust extraterritoriality in 1950,
they certainly do not believe in it today.
28 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 85) 1, 3 (1984).
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